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Over the last decade, the fast penetration of the Internet and the increased
digitization of information have turned piracy of information goods (in partic-
ular music, movies and software) into a topic of intense debate. Not surpris-
ingly, economists have recently shown a renewed interest in information goods
piracy.1 The recent contributions revive the literature on the economics of
copying and copyright, which was initiated some twenty years ago.2 The semi-
nal papers mainly discussed the eﬀects of photocopying and examined, among
other things, how publishers can appropriate indirectly some revenues from il-
legitimate users (Novos and Waldman, 1984, Liebowitz, 1985, Johnson, 1985,
and Besen and Kirby, 1989). The economics of intellectual property (IP) pro-
tection was then addressed more generally by Landes and Posner (1989) and
Besen and Raskind (1991). Both papers discuss the following trade-oﬀ between
ex ante and ex post eﬃciency considerations. From an ex ante point of view,
IP protection preserves the incentive to create information goods, which are
inherently public (absent appropriate protection, creators might not be able
to recoup their potentially high initial creation costs). On the other hand, IP
rights encompass various potential ineﬃciencies from an ex post point of view
(protection grants de facto monopoly rights, which generates the standard dead-
weight losses; also, by inhibiting imitation, IP rights might limit the creators’
ability to borrow from, or build upon, earlier works, and thereby increase the
cost of producing new ideas). A third wave of papers paid closer attention to
software markets and introduced network eﬀects in the analysis. Conner and
Rumelt (1991), Takeyama (1994), and Shy and Thisse (1999) share the follow-
ing argument: because piracy enlarges the installed base of users, it generates
network eﬀects that increase the legitimate users’ willingness to pay for the
software and, thereby, potentially raises the producer’s proﬁts.
To the best of our knowledge, most models address the ex-post issue of
piracy in industries with monopolies. In this context, Bae and Choi (2003)
interestingly demonstrate that the threat of piracy obliges the monopoly to
lower its price, implying that the ﬁrm’s ex-post proﬁt falls whereas the usage of
authorized copy increases. This result provides a sharp contrast to the common
claim of copyright holders, who assert that piracy reduces the demand for a
legal copy. As a result, piracy has positive ex-post welfare implications. Ex-
ante welfare implications crucially depend on how the monopoly’s ex-post losses
caused by piracy aﬀect the ex-ante incentives to provide the goods, their quality
or their diversity.
This literature on the economics of copying obviously abstracts away the
strategic interaction among producers of information goods. It is often argued
1See the excellent survey by Peitz and Waelbroeck (2003) and the references therein.
2With the notable exception of Plant (1934). For a recent survey (and extension) of this
literature, see Watt (2000).
2that the degree of horizontal diﬀerentiation between information goods (like
CDs or books) is so large that one can assume that the demand for any partic-
ular good is independent of the prices of other goods. An exception is Johnson
(1985): his ‘ﬁxed cost model’ considers a copying technology that involves an
investment in costly equipment. As the author emphasizes, “[a]n interesting
feature of this model is that the demand for any particular work is aﬀected
indirectly by the prices of other works since they aﬀect a consumer’s decision
to invest in the copying technology”. However, because the focus is mainly on
the welfare implications of copying, Johnson (1985) does not fully explore the
eﬀects of the strategic interaction induced by the ﬁxed cost of copying.
The aim of the present paper is to study the strategic interactions among
the producers of information goods. On the one hand, in the spirit of Mussa
and Rosen (1978), originals and copies are vertically diﬀerentiated: copies are
seen as lower-quality alternatives to originals (i.e., if copies and originals were
priced the same, all consumers would prefer originals). Copies are produced by
users with increasing returns to scale. On the other hand, diﬀerent information
goods are assumed to be perfectly horizontally diﬀerentiated: information goods
here have independent content as it can be the case of software applications for
games and word processor, or CD recordings of classic and pop music. For the
sake of the exposition, the paper focuses on duopolies and on cheap copying
technologies: copying involves a relatively small ﬁx e dc o s tt ou s e r s .T oo u rv i e w ,
this is the simplest set-up allowing us to highlight the most interesting aspects
of the interaction between producers of independent information goods.3
In this paper, we qualify the traditional results and insights about the im-
pact of copying technology obtained in one-good monopoly settings (e.g., Bae
and Choi, 2003 and Yoon, 2002). When there exist more than one information
good, increasing returns to scale in the copying technology creates an inter-
dependence between the demands for information goods, which are genuinely
independent. Basically, the threat of copying is conveyed through the behav-
iour of ‘switching users’, i.e., those users who are likely to change their choice
of purchasing originals for the acquisition of a copy machine. As a ﬁrst result,
we show that a multiproduct monopoly may set diﬀerent prices for its goods.
Indeed, when copying ﬁxed costs are low enough, switching users hesitate be-
tween buying the two goods and copying both of them. Hence, only the price
of the bundle matters which gives some leeway to the pricing of each good. The
bundle price is nevertheless set as to accommodate those switching users.
In a two-good duopoly, the interaction between ﬁrms leads to interesting
properties. A ﬁrm’s best-response to the price set by the competitor can depict
up to four diﬀerent attitudes. First, when the competitor sets a suﬃciently low
price, users are not enticed to acquire the copying technology and copying is
3In Belleﬂamme and Picard (2004), we provide a broader analytical perspective by letting
the number of producers and the cost of copying take any value.
3not a threat. The ﬁrm is then able to extract the full surplus by setting a high
price. Next, when the competitor sets a higher price, some low valuation users
are enticed to switch to copying. The ﬁrm can then either avoid these switching
users and concentrate on higher valuation users by increasing its price, or it can
accommodate the switching users by lowering its price. It turns out that the
ﬁrst strategy is the most proﬁtable one when the competitor’s price is not too
high. Hence, there exits a range of prices such that prices are strategic comple-
ments (i.e., the best response function is increasing in the competitor’s action).
Moreover, such prices exceed the price set when the competitor quoted a low
price in the ﬁrst instance above. When the competitor further rises its price,
the second strategy prevails: the ﬁrm reduces its price in order to accommodate
the switching users and prices become strategic substitutes. Finally, when the
competitor sets quite large prices, the marginal consumer of the ﬁrm’s good is
no longer a switching user who is indiﬀerent between buying the good and buy-
ing the copying technology. Instead, the marginal consumer becomes a ‘resolute
copier’, who is resolutely decided to purchase and use the copying technology
to copy the competitor’s good. The ﬁrm can charge only a low price to ac-
commodate such a resolute copier. Because the nature of the marginal buyer
suddenly changes as the competitor’s price rises, the best response function
shows discontinuities and equilibria cannot be guaranteed.
As a second result, we show that equilibria in pure strategies do not exist
in duopolies when the ﬁxed cost of copying is low enough. Intuitively, the
inexistence of equilibria stems from ﬁrms’ free-riding behavior with respect to
the threat of piracy. If all ﬁrms takes this threat seriously and quote low prices
to accommodate consumers, then they set too low a price and there exists an
opportunity for any individual ﬁrm to raise its price while keeping a suﬃciently
large demand and making a larger proﬁt. Technically, increasing returns to scale
in the copying technology introduce non-convexities in the proﬁt functions and
undermine the existence of market equilibrium.
Still, an equilibrium in pure strategies exists when the ﬁxed cost of copying
is not too small. At this equilibrium, both ﬁrms accommodate switching users
and quote identical prices. However, we show that the prices in the duopoly
are larger than the (average) price of a multiproduct monopoly. Indeed, as
presented above, ﬁrms loose less by setting higher prices to concentrate on high
valuation users rather than by lowering their prices to keep the low valuation
users who wish to switch to the copy technology. Furthermore, we show that
for some non empty set of parameters, the duopoly prices are larger than the
price of a monopolist who faces no threat of piracy. The externality that ﬁrms
impose on each other can therefore be quite important and it can drastically
reduce the demand for legal copies.
Also, we show that a symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies exists when
the ﬁxed cost of copying is small. Each ﬁrm quotes two prices with positive
4probabilities. Interestingly, the expected price in the mixed-strategy equilib-
rium, though smaller than the price that would prevail in the pure-strategy
equilibrium, remains above the average price set by a multiproduct monopolist.
Finally, we perform a welfare analysis. Considering ﬁrst ex post eﬃciency, we
stress that industry concentration is welfare improving in the present context.
As is the case in Cournot industries with complementary products, prices are
higher in a duopoly than in a multiproduct monopoly. Moreover, we show that
policy measures aiming at strengthening IP protection contribute to increase
further the welfare gap between monopoly and duopoly. Considering next ex
ante eﬃciency, we compare our framework with an economy where only a sin-
gle information good is available. This exercise allows us to measure the (gross)
incentives to create a new information good. Comparing those incentives for an
incumbent ﬁrm and for an entrant, we reach an ambiguous conclusion: creation
incentives are higher for an entrant when the cost of copying is suﬃciently small
and are higher for an incumbent otherwise. Intuitively, the entrant’s incentive
is reduced by the free-riding eﬀect observed in a duopoly, whereas the incum-
bent’s incentive is reduced by a cannibalization eﬀect (copying becomes more
attractive as the number of goods increases). So, when copying is suﬃciently
costly, industry concentration is welfare-enhancing both in the short and in the
long run.
To sum up, our main message is the following. The interactions between
producers of information goods under the threat of piracy dramatically alter
the equilibrium outcome compared to the outcome obtained under a one-good
monopoly setting. Equilibrium prices in pure strategies may not exist and,
if they do, they may be higher than those in the one-good monopoly case.
Inferences about dynamics and welfare implications are not obvious anymore
in oligopolistic industries. For instance, industry concentration may be welfare
improving.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we lay out the
model and we derive the demand schedule for a particular original. In Section 3,
we characterize the two-good monopoly case. In Section 4, we present the two-
good duopoly case. In Section 5, we perform a welfare analysis. We conclude
and propose an agenda for future research in the last section.
2 Demand for originals
There is a continuum of potential users who can consume at most two informa-
tion goods. These information goods are assumed to be perfectly (horizontally)
diﬀerentiated and equally valued by the users. In particular, users are charac-
terized by their valuation, θ, for any information good. We assume that θ is
uniformly distributed on the interval [θ,θ],w i t hθ > 0.
Each information good is imperfectly protected and thus “piratable”. As
5a result, users can obtain each information good in two diﬀerent ways: they
can either buy the legitimate product (an “original”) or acquire a copy of the
product. It is reasonable to assume that all users see the copy as a lower-
quality alternative to the original.4 Therefore, in the spirit of Mussa and Rosen
(1978), we posit some vertical (quality) diﬀerentiation between the two variants
of any information good: letting so and sc denote, respectively, the quality of
an original and a copy, we assume that 0 <s c <s o.5
As for the relative cost of originals and copies, we let pi denote the price
of original i (i =1 ,2) and we assume that users have access to a copying
technology with increasing returns to scale. To keep things simple, we assume
that to be able to copy, consumers must incur a ﬁxed cost K>0. Finally, we
normalize to zero the utility of not consuming an information good.
Table 1 expresses consumer θ’s net utility in the nine possible combinations
of usages for the two information goods.
Good 2
Good 1 Purchased (P) Copied (C) Not used (O)
Purchased (P) θso − p1 + θso − p2 θso − p1 + θsc − K θso − p1
Copied (C) θsc − K + θso − p2 2θsc − K θsc − K
Not used (O) θso − p2 θsc − K 0
Table 1: Net utility of a typical consumer
Note that as θsc > 0 ∀θ, the options (O,C) and (C,O) are dominated by
option (C,C). Indeed, increasing returns to scale in copying imply that if a
user ﬁnds it proﬁtable to copy one original, she is even better oﬀ copying both
originals.
For the sake of the exposition, we further assume that the ﬁxed cost K is
suﬃciently low.
A1: Low copying costs: K<θsc.
Under this assumption, all users prefer copying a single original over not
using any information good (θsc−K>0 ∀θ). This assumption greatly simpliﬁes
the exposition while it retains the main properties of the model. Indeed, it
follows that options (P,O), (O,P) and (O,O) are dominated for any user. In
4This assumption is common (see, e.g., Gayer and Shy, 2003) and may be justiﬁed in several
ways. In the case of analog reproduction, copies represent poor substitutes to originals and are
rather costly to distribute. Although this is no longer true for digital reproduction, originals
might still provide users with a higher level of services, insofar as that they are bundled with
valuable complementary products which can hardly be obtained otherwise.
5Similar models are used by Koboldt (1995) to consider commercial copying and by Yoon
(2002) and Bae and Choi (2003) to analyze the market for a single information good.
6other words, all users will always consume both goods, either by purchasing
the original or by copying it. By eliminating the non-users, the last assumption
allows us to restrict the analysis to the four options (P,P), (P,C), (C,P) and
(C,C).
Furthermore, we claim that this assumption ﬁts the current characteristics
of copying technologies for information goods. It seems indeed that the fraction
of users we choose not to consider (i.e., those for whom θsc−K<0) is constantly
narrowing, as copying devices become widely and cheaply available and as the
“moral barrier” to illegal copying is increasingly fading. The widespread use
of copied music and software in least developed countries corroborates this
assumption.
The demand function for good i is derived as follows. One can write that a
user with type θ buys original i iﬀ
θso − pi +m a x {θso − pj;θsc − K} ≥ max{θso − pj + θsc − K;2θsc − K}. (1)
This inequality compares user θ’s value of purchasing original i, and either
purchasing or copying good j, to the best option available given that he/she
does not purchase original i, namely, copying good i whereas either buying
or copying good j. This inequality can take three diﬀerent forms, each form
corresponding to a speciﬁc category of users.
First, for high valuation users such that θ(so − sc) ≥ pj,e x p r e s s i o n( 1 )
rewrites as




Because these users purchase the other original whether they purchase good i
or copy it, we call them ‘buyers’. The maximum price they are willing to pay
for original i is equal to
pb
i (θ)=θ(so − sc)+K.
That is, they are willing to pay up to the extra value that an original brings
on top of a copy, augmented by the cost of the copying technology (which they
save once they decide to buy i instead of copying it).
Second, for intermediate valuation users such that pj−K ≤ θ(so − sc) ≤ pj,
expression (1) rewrites as
θso − pi + θso − pj ≥ 2θsc − K ⇐⇒ θ ≥
pi + pj − K
2(so − sc)
.
For these users, the best use of one good depends on the best use of the other
good: if they purchase good i, they also purchase good j;i ft h e yc o p yg o o d
i,t h e ya l s oc o p yg o o dj. We therefore call them ‘switchers’.H o wm u c ha r e
switchers willing to pay for good i? Going from two copies to two originals,
7they earn twice the extra value of an original compared to a copy, and they
trade the cost of the copying technology for the price of the other original. So,
their maximum price is given by:
ps
i (θ,p j)=2 θ(so − sc)+K − pj.
Finally, for low valuation users such that θ(so − sc) ≤ pj − K, expression
(1) rewrites as




Because these users copy good j no matter what they decide about good i,w e
call them ‘resolute copiers’. What they are willing to pay for good i is just the
extra value of an original compared to a copy (for they have already sunk the
cost of the copying technology). Their maximum price is thus equal to:
pc
i (θ)=θ(so − sc).
The three price functions are depicted in Figure 1. We observe that de-
pending on the price of good j, the price function for good i c a nh a v eu pt o
two kinks. The price function is (increasing and) concave in θ in the neighbor-
hood of pj/(so − sc) (which separates switchers from buyers), and (increasing
and) convex in θ in the neighborhood of (pj − K)/(so − sc) (which separates
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Figure 1: Prices as functions of θ.
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if pi <p j − K (resolute copiers)
(2)
8When pj is very small, the marginal users are buyers. When pj is very high,
the marginal users always choose to copy good j and they are resolute copiers.
When pj is close to pi, the marginal users choose to copy according to the value
of the bundle, pi + pj. The demand function has the same concave and convex
kink as the price function depicted above.
3 Multiproduct monopoly
The monopoly chooses prices p1 and p2 so as to maximize proﬁts:
max
p1,p2
πm = p1D1 (p1,p 2)+p2D2 (p1,p 2).
where demands are given by (2) and where the ﬁrm is assumed to have zero
production cost.
Suppose w.l.o.g. that p1 ≤ p2. Then, the monopolist gets the following




















m =( p1 + p2)
µ
θ −
p1 + p2 − K
2(so − sc)
¶
s.t. p1 ≥ p2 − K.
When prices diﬀer by more than the ﬁxed cost K,t h eﬁrm faces two groups
of consumers: resolute copiers and buyers. When prices are close, the ﬁrm faces
only switchers. As recorded in the following proposition, it turns out that the
monopolist always chooses the latter option.
Proposition 1 Under low copying cost (A1), the multiproduct monopolist sets
any price (p1,p 2) such that (p1 + p2)/2=pm ≡ θ(so − sc)/2+K/4 and p2 −
K<p 1 ≤ p2.
Proof. The unconstrained solution to the ﬁrst problem is p1 = θ(so − sc)/2
and p2 = θ(so − sc)/2+K/2. This solution does not meet the constraint
because p1 >p 2 − K. The solution of the ﬁrst problem is thus the corner









The second problem is equivalent to
max










, which we forget from now on as
it does not aﬀect optimal decisions.


















m = K2/(8(so − sc)) > 0 completes the proof. The
second problem includes an inﬁnity of prices (p1,p 2) such that (p1 + p2)/2=pm
subject to the contraint set in this second problem: p1 ≥ p2 − K.
The monopolist sells the two goods at prices such that marginal buyers
are switchers. Prices are limited upward to avoid that marginal users become
resolute copiers. Prices are not unique neither symmetric.
It must be noted that, by assumption A1, the monopoly sets an average
price pm which is smaller than the price it would set for each good if there were
no threat of copy, namely θso/2.P r o ﬁts are also smaller.
We now turn to the study of the duopoly.
4D u o p o l y
Under a duopoly, each information good i ∈ {1,2} i sp r o d u c e da n ds o l db ya
separate ﬁrm. We proceed in two steps: ﬁrst, we derive ﬁrm i’s best reponse
and then we compute the Bertrand-Nash price equilibria.
4.1 Best response function
Best response functions are derived from the demand functions (2). Because
the demand functions are piece-wise linear and include a convex kink, ﬁrms’
best response functions are expected to be discontinuous. In fact, the point of
discontinuity will take place when marginal users shift from being switchers to
resolute copiers. We now characterize the portion of the best response of ﬁrm
i below and above the discontinuity.
Targeting buyers or switchers? The optimal price and proﬁt on the buyers


























Firm i’s best response is to set pi = pb∗
i as long as the competitor’s price
does not to entice the marginal consumer to become a switcher. Using (2), this
is so as long as
pj ≤ pb∗




θ(so − sc) − K
¢
.
10Note that pf > 0 ⇐⇒ K<θ(so − sc).
For pj >p f, some low valuation users are enticed to switch to copying.
Firm i can either accommodate these switching users by lowering its price, or
it can avoid them and concentrate on higher valuation users by increasing its
price. On the one hand, when pj is low enough, ﬁrm i sets a ‘limit price’ to
‘deter’ switchers. By (2), it sets a price equal to
pD
i (pj)=pj + K
(or just a small amount below this price) and achieves a corresponding proﬁt
of πD
i (pj). This price is an increasing function of pj. Since more users tend to
switch to the copying technology when the competitor raises its price pj, ﬁrm
i must raise its price pi to avoid the switchers. Hence, there exits a range of
prices such that prices are strategic complements.
When pj gets larger, ﬁrm i has no other choice but to accommodate switch-
ers. It sets a price equal to ps∗
i (pj) where
ps∗





pi + pj − K
2(so − sc)
¶














This price is a decreasing function of the competitor’s price; prices are then
strategic substitutes in this range of prices.
The transition between deterrence and accommodation of switchers takes
place at the price pd such that deterence and accommodation of switchers yield













2θ(so − sc) − K
¢
>p f.
Note that pd > 0 ⇐⇒ K<2θ(so − sc).
Targeting resolute copiers? Because of the convex kink in the demand
function, the shift from switchers to copiers has to be analyzed by comparing





















We readily get that
πs∗
i (pj) > πc∗







11The regime including accommodation of switchers is part of the best re-
sponse function as long as





θ(so − sc).( 3 )
In this case there exits a downard jump at pj = pe.
Otherwise, accommodation of switchers is not part of the best response
function and the latter has a downward jump from deterrence of switchers to
accommodation of resolute copiers for another price pj = pe0,w h e r eπD
i (pe0)=
πc∗
















Partial market coverage. The above results apply when the best response
does not entail full market coverage. That is, when the user with the low-
est valuation is not served by any ﬁrm. In other words, the solutions to the
a b o v ep r o b l e m sm u s tb ei n t e r i o rs o l u t i o ns. The following lemma provides the
condition under which the above results remain valid.
Lemma 1 The optimal prices pb∗
i , ps∗
i (pj) and pc∗
i are interior solutions and





(so − sc). (4)
Proof. The price pb∗
i is an interior solution iﬀ pb∗
i >p b
i(θ) ⇐⇒ K< ¡
θ − 2θ
¢
(so − sc). The price ps∗
i (pj) with pj ≥ 0 is an interior solution iﬀ
ps
i (θ,p j) <p s∗




(so − sc) The price pc∗
i is an
interior solution iﬀ pc∗
i >p c
i (θ) ⇐⇒ θ − 2θ > 0.I t i s e a s y t o s e e t h a t t h e
condition for pb∗
i implies the two other conditions.
Suppose that condition (4) holds. Then, under condition (3), the best re-
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pb∗
i if pj ≤ pf,
pD
i (pj) if pf ≤ pj ≤ pd,
ps∗
i (pj) if pd ≤ pj ≤ pe,
pc∗
i if pj >p e.







i if pj ≤ pf,
pD
i (pj) if pf ≤ pj ≤ pe0,
pc∗
i if pj >p e0.
Figure 2 displays these functions (in black for ﬁrms 1 a n di ng r e yf o rﬁrm 2)f o r





















d   p
e   p
f  p
e’ 
Figure 2. Best Response Functions.
When condition (4) does not hold, the shape of the best response functions
slightly diﬀer. It can readily be observed that the prices set by a ﬁrm that
is constrained by full market coverage are never lower than the unconstrained
prices pb∗
i , ps∗
i (pj) and pc∗
i that we computed above. Indeed, the marginal
consumer that is targeted by the unconstrained prices has a type below θ.
Since this marginal consumer does not exist, the ﬁrm increases its prices up
to the lowest possible valuation θ. As a consequence, some segments of the
best response function may be shifted upwards. Also, some segments may have
diﬀerent shapes. Furthermore, when the lowest valuation θ is large enough,
the discontinuities may vanish. To abstract away such complexities, we assume
that condition (4) is met in the analysis that follows.
4.2 Existence of equilibria in pure strategies
Because of discontinuities in the best response functions, equilibria in pure
strategies might fail to exist. Intuitively, the possible inexistence of equilibria
stems from ﬁrms’ free-riding behavior with respect to the threat of copying.
If both ﬁrms take this threat seriously and quote low prices to accommodate
resolute copiers, then there exists an opportunity for either ﬁrm to raise its
price while keeping a suﬃciently large demand and making a larger proﬁt. This
situation is shown in the right-hand panel of Figure 1 where best response
functions do no intersect. By contrast, the left-hand panel shows the situation
where ﬁrms reach an equilibrium as their best response function intersect at a
symmetric equilibrium. More formally, we can state the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Suppose that assumption A1 and condition (4) hold. There ex-
ists a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in which both ﬁrms focus on switchers











θ(so − sc). (5)
Otherwise, there is no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
13Proof. See Appendix 1.
The market fails to reach an equilibrium for small ﬁxed costs of copying
because the price pS and the proﬁt associated to this strategy decrease with K.
For a low enough value of K,p r o ﬁts under accomodation of resolute copiers
become more attractive and ﬁrms tend to cut their price to pc∗
i .A sar e s u l t ,t h e
absence of duopoly equilibria for low ﬁxed costs of the copying technology casts
some doubts about traditional analyses of the threat of copying in one-good
monopoly settings.
4.3 Properties of symmetric equilibria
We now focus on the situation in which the market reaches a symmetric equi-














Corollary 4.1 The price set by duopolists at the pure-strategy equilibrium is
higher than the average price set by the multiproduct monopolist.
The intuition is simple. At equilibrium, the duopolists focus on switchers;
the copying technology constitutes thus a common substitute for their original
good. The presence of this common substitute turns goods i and j (which are
a priori perfectly horizontally diﬀerentiated) into complementary goods. The
multiproduct monopolist has an incentive to decrease prices further than the
duopolists do because he realizes that decreasing the price for one good increases
demand for the other good by making copying less attractive. This is just the
same argument as for Cournot’s model of complementary products.
The externality that each ﬁrm imposes on the other can be quite important.
Indeed, for some range of admissible parameters, the duopolists end up setting
prices larger than the price they would set under no copying threat. To see this,
note that a user θ ∈ [θ,θ] who purchases the original good i gets a utility of θso−








and is independent of the demand for the other good. Firms in duopoly and
monopoly thus set the same price, the monopoly price: pM = 1
2θso. Comparing
it to pS yields the following corollary.
Corollary 4.2 The price set by duopolists at the pure-strategy equilibrium is




θ(4sc − so). (6)
This condition deﬁnes a non empty set of parameters under A1, (4) and (5).
Proof. It is easy to check that pS ≥ pM is equivalent to (6). To prove that
the set of parameters supporting this price is not empty, we set K to the binding
14level of assumption A1: K = θsc. Using this, conditions (4), (5) and (6) can
be written as functions of θ/θ and so/sc. So we can make the normalization























The last two corollaries qualify the argument that the threat of piracy forces
ﬁrms to lower their prices and that the usage of authorized copies increases with
piracy. Instead, our model gives some evidence to the common claim of copy-
right holders, who assert that piracy reduces the demand for legal copies. These
results also cast some doubt about the social beneﬁts of stronger competition
in information good markets that are subject to potential piracy. The two last
corollaries indeed suggest that a more concentrated industry is better equipped
to provide surplus both to legal consumers and to producers.
4.4 Properties of mixed strategy equilibria
When b K>K , there exist no equilibria with pure strategies. Nevertheless, by
Glicksberg (1952), there is a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium because proﬁts
are continuous. Moreover, as in Boccard and Wauthy (1997, 2003), the piece-
wise linearity of the demand function allows us to show that ﬁrms do not use
continuous densities. We present here a simple and intuitive class of mixed
strategy equilibria in which ﬁrms play two prices with the same probability dis-
tributions. The following proposition shows that such equilibria exist provided
that ﬁxed costs are not too small. Let b K0 =0 .0274θ(so − sc) ∈ (0, b K).
Proposition 3 When b K>K>b K0, there exists an equilibrium where ﬁrms





2θ(so − sc)+( x +1 )K
x +3
with probabilities x and 1 − x. The probability x i se q u a lt oz e r ow h e nK is
equal to b K, it increases when K increase above b K and it is equal to x =0 .3603
when K tends to b K0. Prices are such that pb >p a + K.
Proof. See Appendix 2.
Unfortunately the probability x has no explicit expression. Numerical sim-
ulations show that for any admissible set of parameters, the probability x
monotonically increases when K falls from b K to b K0.
Because pb >p a + K, the two price mixed strategies equilibrium yields
ex-post realizations that include the three regimes with a positive probability.
Each ﬁrm faces switchers when its price realization is equal to the other ﬁrm’s
15realization; it faces buyers when it quotes the lowest price and resolute copiers
when it quotes the highest price. It is easy to show that ﬁrms randomize with
prices that lie between the price pc∗
i (charged to resolute copiers) and the price
pS (corresponding to the pure-strategy equilibrium of Proposition 2).
Corollary 4.3 Prices are ranked as follows: pc∗
i <p a <p a + K<p b <p S.
Hence, the average price in this mixed-strategy equilibrium is smaller than
the price in the pure-strategy equilibrium. Intuitively, ﬁrm i has no incentive
to set prices below pc∗
i because, if it does, it gets a positive marginal revenue
irrespective of ﬁrm j’s mixed strategy. Similarly, it gets a negative marginal
revenue whenever it sets a price above pS.
When K<b K0, symmetric mixed strategies with two prices are not equi-
libria; ﬁrms randomize over a larger number of prices. The characterization of
such equilibria goes beyond the scope of this paper. Note that the previous
corollary still applies.
5 Welfare analysis
As indicated in Section 1, the economics of IP protection discusses the trade-oﬀ
between ex ante and ex post eﬃciency considerations: to remedy the long-
run underproduction problem that might arise from insuﬃcient incentives to
create, the law grants exclusive rights to creators, which entail a short-run
underutilization problem.
Our simple framework allows us to shed some new light on this policy debate.
First, in a short-run perspective, we can perform comparative statics exercises
to assess the eﬀects of stronger IP protection; we can also compare the welfare
performances of two market structures, namely a multiproduct monopoly versus
a duopoly. Second, in a long-run perspective, we can measure incentives to
create and compare again the relative merits of monopoly and duopoly.
5.1 Ex post eﬃciency considerations
In many discussions, the protection of intellectual property (IP) rights calls for
an increase in the cost of piracy (Novos and Waldman (1984), Yoon (2002), etc).
In this model, this would call for two policy measures: ﬁrst, one can apply a tax
on the reproduction devices so that the ﬁxed cost of the copying technology, K,
increases; second, one can take actions to decrease the value of a copy sc.
When a pure-strategy equilibrium exists, we can easily analyze the eﬀects of
a marginal strengthening of IP rights. Let θS ≡
£
4θ(so − sc) − K
¤
/[6(so − sc)]
be the type of the switching user at the equilibrium prices pS. This is the lowest
type amongst the consumers who purchase an original good. Users with type
θ ∈ [θS,θ] purchase an original whereas, by assumption A1,u s e r sw i t ht y p e
16θ ∈ [θ,θS) make use of copies. Hence, on the one hand, a rise in the copying
cost (dK > 0) implies an upward parallel shift of the demand by switching
users. It then increases equilibrium prices (dpS > 0) and increases the set of
consumers of original goods (dθS < 0). The number of copiers falls. On the
other hand, a deterioration of the value of copies (dsc < 0) implies a rotation
of the demand by swiching users, thereby diminishing the elasticity of this
demand. The deterioration of the value of copies then leads to an increase in
price (dpS > 0) and to a reduction of the set of consumers buying original goods
(dθS > 0). The number of copiers increases.
Welfare properties can be obtained as follows. An increase in K induces
variations in proﬁts through eﬀects on price and demand. Changes in the






which, as just shown, is positive for dK > 0 but is ambiguous for dsc < 0.I ti s
readily veriﬁed that dPS/dsc > 0 iﬀ K>2θ(so − sc). So, producers’ surplus
increases when copies are damaged if K is suﬃciently small.
The consumers’ surplus obtained from the use of both information goods
includes four eﬀects: the negative eﬀect on illegal copiers because of the increase
in the copying cost K; the negative eﬀect of the deterioration of copies on
the copying users; the negative eﬀect of larger prices on legal consumers; and
ﬁnally the eﬀect on the switching users who move from copying to purchasing
an original. At the price pS, the latter eﬀect on switching users is nil because
switching users are indiﬀerent between copying and purchasing the orginals.
Hence,
dCS = −(θS − θ)dK +( θS − θ)





which is negative because all terms are non positive (dK > 0,ds c < 0,dp S > 0).
Consumers are negatively aﬀected by both policy measures.
Finally total surplus writes as
dTS = dPS + dCS = −(θS − θ)dK − (θS − θ)
2 dsc − 2pSdθS.
The latter expression is negative if the additional costs imposed on all copiers is
smaller than the additional revenue from having an additional legal consumer.
This is the case when the policy measure consists of deteriorating the copies
(dsc < 0). When the policy measure consists of an increase in the ﬁxed cost of
copying (dK > 0), the sign of the welfare change is ambiguous. These welfare
results are consistent with Bae and Choi (2003).
Proposition 4 In the region of parameters where a pure-strategy equilibrium
exists, a rise in K raises the equilibrium prices and the demand for originals,
while a fall in sc raises the equilibrium prices but decreases the demand for
17originals. Consumers’ surplus decreases with both actions. Producers’ surplus
increases with a rise in K whereas it also increases with a fall in sc only if the
copying cost is suﬃciently small. Finally, total surplus decreases with a fall in
sc while a rise in K have ambiguous eﬀects.
Proof. We just need to show that the direction of total surplus is am-






. This condition is compatible with assumption A1 and





that are convex combinations of (3,2.5), (4.5,2.3) and (4.2,2.3).





that are convex combinations of (3.5,2.6), (2,3) and (2,8).
The reader will also observe that the above conclusion about total surplus
heavily hinges on the assumption of ineﬃcient taxation. Indeed, if we assume
that tax proceeds are eﬃciently redistributed to consumers through lump sum
transfers, taxation has no direct cost and the terms in dK vanish in the above
expressions. As a result, while consumers’ surplus still falls with larger K, total
surplus does increase with it: taxation on the copying technology improves
welfare. This remark is not speciﬁct ot h eﬁrms’ interaction and we conjecture
that it is valid for other models.
The above welfare analysis can easily be replicated for the multi-product mo-




2θ(so − sc) − K
¢
/(so − sc).N o t et h a tw h e nK rises (dK > 0) and sc falls
(dsc < 0), the monopoly price and demand varies in the same direction as in
the duopoly (dpm > 0 and dθm < 0). As a result the above welfare analysis
remains valid for multi-product monopolists.7 The welfare eﬀects of a tax on
the copying technology and of a deterioration of the value of copies have the
same direction. Still, those eﬀects do not have the same amplitudes.
As far as the comparison between monopoly and duopoly is concerned, we
have already indicated in the previous section that the multiproduct monopolist
always sets lower prices than duopolists do. As the monopolist also achieves
higher proﬁts, total surplus is undoubtedly higher under monopoly. It can
further be shown that the two policy measures analyzed here contribute to
increase further the welfare gap between monopoly and duopoly. Indeed, a few
lines of computations establish that








On the one hand, it is obvious that d∆TS/dK > 0. On the other hand,
d∆TS/dsc < 0 provided that K<2θ(so − sc), which is clearly implied by
7One can also check that a rise in K has ambiguous eﬀects on welfare in a multi-product









(1.3,10) for a welfare increase.
18condition (4). In other words, a strengthening of IP rights makes the case for
a concentrated market structure even more appealing.
5.2 Ex ante eﬃciency considerations
Comparing our framework with an economy where only a single information
good is available allows us to measure the (gross) incentive to create a new
information good. In the previous model, if only one information good is
available instead of two, it is easy to see that under assumption A1, the pro-











, and the optimal price and proﬁta r eg i v e nb y
pb∗
i and πb∗















There are two cases to consider when going from one to two goods. A ﬁrst pos-
sibilitly is that the new good is created by an incumbent ﬁrm that already pro-
duces the extant good; the ex post economy is then organised as a multiproduct
monopoly. From Proposition 1, we know that the multiproduct monopolist’s













One readily observes that, under condition (4), we have that πm > πb∗
i , meaning
that an incumbent ﬁrm has a gross incentive to introduce a second good. Still,
although goods are genuinely independent, the proﬁt per good decreases when
the number of goods rises: πm < 2πb∗
i . The monopolist indeed jeopardizes the
sales of the ﬁrst good when it introduces the second good. Copying becomes
more attractive when the number of goods is larger and the ﬁrm is compelled
to reduce the average price of originals.
Alternatively, the new good could be created by an entrant ﬁrm, turning the
ex post economy into a duopoly. Supposing for simplicity that the condition














Let us now compare the two scenarios. Comparing prices, it is easily checked
that condition (4) implies the following ranking: pm <p b∗
i <p S.T h e r e f o r e ,the
average price decreases when the new good is introduced by an incumbent ﬁrm,
whereas it increases when the new good is introduced by an entrant. This is
another illustration of the negative externality independent producers impose
on each other, and on consumers, in the presence of copying.
19Next, comparing proﬁts, we can gauge the (gross) incentive to create in the
two settings. We say that the incumbent has higher incentives to create if it
increases more its proﬁt by introducing the second good than would an entrant
do. That is, if πm−πb∗
i > πS. Under no threat of piracy, goods are independent
and incentives for the incumbent and the entrant are exactly equal. However,
under piracy, the free-riding problem between ﬁrms may harm more the entrant
than the above canibalization eﬀect hurts the incumbent. As both free-riding
and canibalization eﬀects on proﬁts increase in K, the comparison between
the incumbent’s and entrant’s incentives to create is a priori ambiguous. As
recorded in the next proposition, there exist conﬁgurations of parameters for
which the incumbent has more to gain from the introduction of a new good than
an entrant does. Industry concentration may therefore yield higher incentives
to create new varieties and, therefore, be more eﬃcient both in the short and
in the long run.
Proposition 5 In the region of parameters where a pure-strategy equilibrium
exists in the duopoly game, an incumbent ﬁrm has higher incentives to introduce






θ(so − sc). (7)
This condition deﬁnes a non empty set of parameters under A1, (4) and (5).
Proof. First, it is easy to check that πm − πb∗
i ≥ πS is equivalent to (7).
To prove that this condition is compatible with the other restrictions, we set
K to the binding level of assumption A1: K = θsc. Using this, conditions (4),
(5) and (7) can be written as functions of θ/θ and so/sc.S ow ec a nm a k et h e

























6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we qualify the traditional results and insights about the impact of
piracy obtained in a one-good monopoly setting. When there exist more than
one information goods, increasing returns to scale in the copying technology
create an interdependence between the demands for information goods, which
are genuinely independent. We ﬁrst show that a multiproduct monopoly may
set diﬀerent prices for its goods. We then show that two-product duopolies
are subject to free-riding behaviors with respect to the threat of piracy. If the
two ﬁrms take this threat seriously by quoting low prices, then there exists
20an opportunity for a ﬁrm to take advantage of this situation and to raise its
price. This can yield to the absence of an equilibrium in pure strategies if
the ﬁxed cost of copying is low enough. In this case, ﬁrms may randomize
between two prices. To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst contribution
showing that price dispersion in information good industries can be generated
by the presence of piracy. When the ﬁxed cost of copying is not too small,
the market can yield a symmetric equilibrium with prices that are larger than
the (average) price of the multiproduct monopoly. Furthermore, those prices
can even become larger than the price of a monopoly which faces no threat of
piracy. The externality that ﬁrms impose on each other can therefore be quite
important and it can drastically reduce the demand for legal copies. Hence, the
interactions between producers of information goods under the threat of piracy
dramatically alter the equilibrium outcome compared to the outcome obtained
under a one-good monopoly setting. Still, short run welfare implications for
symmetric equilibria are close to the ones obtained for the one-good monopoly.
Finally, we show that under particular conditions, multi-product monopolies
may provide better incentives to create. To sum up, industry concentration can
be welfare improving under the threat of piracy.
The present model suggests several avenues of future research. First, the
current study is limited to the production of two perfectly diﬀerentiated in-
formation goods. It would be worthwhile to explore the pricing decisions and
welfare aspects under piracy threat in a setting with more numerous and less
diﬀerentiated varieties. Second, by assuming exogenous production and pricing
of the copying technology, the current model sets aside the strategic issue of
integration between the creators (or distributors) of information goods and the
sellers of copying devices. It seems natural to investigate about the competition
and welfare implications of such integration processes.
A p p e n d i x1 .P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
Each best response function p∗
i (·) and p∗
j (·) can have four segments. Removing
symmetric conﬁgurations, we need to check the existence of a pure strategy
equilibria for the 10 following conﬁgurations. For some conﬁgurations we will
need to distinguish equilibrium conditions in which the switcher’s branch ps∗
j (·)
exists (i.e. pd ≤ pe or condition (3)) or in which it does not (i.e. pd >p e or the







cannot be an equilibrium because pb∗
j >p f















cannot be an equilibrium because the
system pi = pD
i (pj) and pj = pD







is an equilibrium if and only if K>
b K ≡ 3
√
2−4
2 θ(so − sc). Indeed, solving the system pi = ps∗
i (pj) and pj =
ps∗





. It is a best response
for both ﬁrms to set pi = ps∗
i (pj) if and only if pd ≤ pS ≤ pe.T h e
ﬁrst inequality is clearly met, whereas the second is met provided that
pS <p e ⇐⇒ K>3
√
2−4
2 θ(so − sc).This last condition is compatible







cannot be an equilibrium because one can
check that pc∗
j <p e and pc∗

































































cannot be an equilibrium because when pd ≤
pe, one can easily check that pb∗







j .A l s o ,w h e n
pd >p e,w eg e tpb∗
i <p e0 iﬀ K<2















cannot be an equilibrium because solv-
ing for pi = pD
i (pj) and pj = ps∗
j (pi),w eg e tpj = e pj ≡ 2
3θ(so − sc) >p d,
meaning that p∗








cannot be an equilibrium because when







j + K = 1
2θ(so − sc)+K<p e.W h e n







2θ(so − sc)+K<p e0 iﬀ K<1
4θ(so − sc),

















cannot be an equilibrium because, for this





pe ⇐⇒ K ≤ 0.328θ(so − sc),a n d( b )pc∗
i ≥ pd ⇐⇒ K ≥ 0.5θ(so − sc),
which is incompatible with (a).
22A p p e n d i x2 .P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3

























if pj ∈ [pi + K,∞)
Each section of the proﬁt function is concave in pi.
We consider mixed-strategy equilibria that include two price atoms pai and
pbi played by player i with probabilities xi and 1−xi.F i r mi’s expected proﬁt
is equal to
Πi = xixjπ (pai,p aj)+xi (1 − xj)π(pai,p bj)
+(1− xi)xjπ(pbi,p aj)+( 1− xi)(1− xj)π (pbi,p bj).
We look for a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium. This exists if we can ﬁnd
probabilities and prices such that (x,pa,p b)=( xi,p ai,p bi), i =1 ,2 and
(xi,p ai,p bi) = arg max
(xi,pai,pbi)
Πi s.t. (xj,p aj,p bj)=( x,pa,p b),i =1 ,2.
First, suppose that the symmetric equilibrium is such that pb ≤ pa+K.F o r
(xi,p ai,p bi), i ∈ {1,2} close enough to (x,pa,p b), ﬁrm i’s payoﬀ is given by the
function
Πi = xixjπs (pai,p aj)+xi (1 − xj)πs (pai,p bj)
+(1− xi)xjπs (pbi,p aj)+( 1− xi)(1− xj)πs (pbi,p bj).
Because πs is strictly concave, it is easy to show that there is a unique symmetric
equilibrium with pS = pai = pbi,i∈ {1,2}. This is the equilibrium with pure
strategies found in Proposition 2.
Second, suppose that the symmetric equilibrium is such that pb >p a + K.
For (xi,p ai,p bi), i ∈ {1,2} close enough to (x,pa,p b), ﬁrm i’s expected payoﬀ
writes as
Πi = xixjπs (pai,p aj)+xi (1 − xj)πc (pai)
+(1− xi)xjπb (pbi)+( 1− xi)(1− xj)πs (pbi,p bj).
There are three ﬁrst order conditions for equilibrium:
∂Πi
∂pai
=0 ⇐⇒ xi =0 or xjπs




=0 ⇐⇒ xi =1 or xjπb






xjπs (pai,p aj)+( 1− xj)πc (pai)
−xjπb (pbi) − (1 − xj)πs (pbi,p bj)
)
=0 (8)
23where the subscript pi denotes a partial diﬀerentiation w.r.t. to pi.T h e s et h r e e






< 0 and the Hessian
determinant is zero:
|H| =










¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
=0
We now determine the symmetric equilibrium by setting (x,pa,p b)=( xi,p ai,p bi),









πs (pb,p b) − πc (pa)
πs (pa,p a)+πs (pb,p b) − πc (pa) − πb (pb)
.
One can check that pb >p a + K which is consistent with the condition pbi >
pai + K, i ∈ {1,2}.
Equilibrium proﬁts can be computed as the following functions of x:
πc (pa)=
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(x +1 )2 θs +( 1− x)K
¢
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θs(x +1 )+2 K
¢
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2K (x +3 )( 4− x)
¡
x2K +2 θsx − θs − 2K
¢ . (9)
Hence x is the solution of a polynomial with degree 5. There is at least one real
solution. We have found no analytical solution.


























As m a l l e rK increases the probability x above zero. Hence, mixed strategy
equilibria occur for K<b K and pure strategy equilibria occur otherwise.
Furthermore, when x =0and K = b K, we have that Πi = πc∗
i and that
24dΠi/dK = ∂Πi/∂K +( dx/dK)(∂Πi/∂x)=( −10 +
√
2)θ < 0. Therefore, ex-
pected proﬁts under symmetric mixed strategy increase above πc∗
i as K de-
creases below b K.F o r K smaller and close enough to b K, symmetric mixed
strategy dominate the price strategy pc∗
i .





1 (pb). So the RHS of expression (9) indeﬁnite. To solve this prob-
lem, we approximate expression (9) by dropping terms in K of order larger than
one and we get
K
¡







x2 − x +2
¢
=0
which yields the unique solution x =1 /2 when K → 0. Applying this result, we
get that the expected proﬁts is equal to πc∗
i −θs/196. Therefore, the symmetric
strategy is dominated by the strategy pc∗
i when K → 0.
The previous paragraphs suggest that the two-price symmetric mixed strat-
egy is a local maximum and that it can be dominated by the one-price strategy
pc∗
i for small enough K. To check when the symmetric mixed strategy is a
global maximum, let us ﬁx ﬁrm j’s strategy as (xj,p aj,p bj)=( x,pa,p b) where
x>0, and we sketch ﬁrm i’s expected proﬁt as a function of the single price
pi:
Πi = xixπ(pi,p a)+xi (1 − x)π (pi)
+(1− xi)xπ (pi)+( 1− xi)(1− x)π(pi,p).
It is readily shown that Πi (pi) is a piece-wise quadratic and concave func-
tion. Consider pi increasing from zero. One can check that the ﬁrst section of
Πi (pi) is either increasing or bell-shaped with a maximum at pc∗
i ; the second
section is bell-shaped with maximum at pi = pa; the third section is monotoni-
cally increasing; the fourth section is bell-shaped with maximum at pi = pb and
the last section is monotonically decreasing. There are three candidates for a
global maximum: pi = pa,p b and pc∗
i . We know that expected proﬁts are equal
at pi = pa and pi = pb so that ﬁrm i is indiﬀerent between the two prices. The
expected proﬁt under symmetric mixed strategy can be evaluated by setting
xi =1and pai = pa:
Π∗
i ≡ xπs (pa,p a)+( 1− x)πc (pa)=
2sθ +( 2− x)Kx
2s(4 − x)
2
We now compare this proﬁt level with the one obtained under strategy pc∗
i .
Some computations show that Π∗
i ≥ πc∗
i is equivalent to
2x(2 − x)K2 +8 θs(2 − x)K − xs2θ
2
≥ 0
Hence, K ≥ K1(x) ≡ θs
¡




/[2x(x − 2)].N o t et h a t
the probability x depends on K. To get the probability x that makes this
25inequality binding and that is simultaneously compatible with a mixed strategy
equilibrium, we insert K1(x) in expression (8), we evaluate at the symmetric
mixed strategy equilibrium to get





+ x(48 + x(−1+x(−8+x(−1+2 x)))) = 0
This equation has a unique solution in the interval x ∈ (0,1) which is equal
to b x0 =0 .3603. The associated level of ﬁxed cost of copying is equal to b K0 =
0.02739sθ < b K.
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